My take on Op Sindoor

I distinctly recall the night four months ago: I woke up for a drink of water in the wee hours of the 7th of May 2025. My aunt, who was awake, said, ‘We’ve hit them.’ As the statement landed on my groggy brain, I grunted. A moment later, clearing Aunt’s confusion, I made my appreciation more apparent.

April 22 was a dark day for India. The 26 civilian men at the Baisaran Valley were brutally murdered after the attackers identified their religion; the women were spared to narrate their horror to Mr Modi.

A timeline of subsequent events is available here.

The Resistance Front

The Resistance Front, announced its existence in October 2019,¹ shortly after the abrogation of Article 370. Known for its prolific social media presence, the group claimed its first attack with a statement that framed their violence as an “indigenous resistance” against the Indian administration, what they call the “Settler Colonial Occupation of Jammu and Kashmir”.

Today’s grenade attack is the inception of indigenous resistance of Kashmir to flush out the occupational Indian regime out of IOJK. The attack was carried out by our cadres, and in future such attacks will follow.

—The Resistance Front, 2019

The organization portrays itself as a group of Kashmiris fighting for the independence of Kashmir, portraying itself as secular (as in, devoid of religious affiliations), however, in practice, its actions speak otherwise:

• October 2021, Jammu & Kashmir: TRF claimed a series of sectarian murders. It labelled Kashmiri Pandit Makhan Lal Bindroo an “RSS stooge,” justifying his killing, and later announced further attacks on anyone deemed “anti-Kashmir”.
• October 7 2021, Eidgah, Srinagar: TRF took responsibility for the murders of Sikh teacher Supinder Kaur and Hindu teacher Deepak Chand, accusing them of pressuring parents to salute the Indian flag.
• April 22 2025, Pahalgam: TRF militants interrogated victims about their faith and tested their knowledge of Islamic texts before killing them during the Baisaran Valley attack.

J&K Police Chief Dilbagh Singh described these killings as attempts to “create a communal situation” and stoke fear among minority communities, underscoring the overtly religious motive behind TRF’s violence, adding to which is:

This is our land, and we will go to any extent to protect it. There’s still time, leave our land, or we will be forced to step up action against you… The purpose of picking up arms is not victory or defeat. We want to show the world that you can cut off a Muslim’s head but never force him to bow before tyrants. We will never become slaves to cruel rulers and non-believers.

—The Resistance Front

Links to Pakistan emerge for two reasons:

1. The Resistance Front is believed to be a front of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (or LeT).²
2. The Resistance Front has been reported to be linked to the Inter-Services Intelligence (or ISI) of Pakistan.³

Shortly after the Pahalgam attack, TRF initially claimed responsibility, then retracted the statement, attributing the earlier claim to a “coordinated cyber intrusion” allegedly bearing fingerprints of Indian cyber‑intelligence​⁴ operatives.

Terror outfits are believed to make and deny claims based on public response. The public response to the Pahalgam attack was sharply negative in Kashmir, with the Kashmiris coming out in protest of the attack.

Since the revocation of Article 370 and Article 35A, Kashmir lost its special status, including reservations for the locals in jobs and exclusivity in property ownership. The abrogation led to the issuance of roughly 85,000 permits to non-locals and resettlement of about 40,000 Kashmir Pandit familes.⁵ Many argue that these demographic shifts have inflamed local grievances.

If some Kashmiris genuinely view TRF as a revolutionary force seeking independence, the group would benefit from portraying itself as a benevolent actor. However, when the organization’s narrative clashes with the reality that one of the 25 Indian nationals killed was a Kashmiri Muslim, it makes sense for TRF to withdraw its claim and blame Indian cyber-intelligence—a plausible deflection, though the likelihood of Indian agencies conducting such a hack remains low in the absence of a clear motive benefiting the Indian agencies.

Pakistan, through LeT (or TRF) could benefit from the attack, though:

1. US Vice President J D Vance was in India, seeking closer ties with the US, amid the growing trade war between the US and China. (China and Pakistan are all-weather friends.)
2. The Waqf Amendment Act, recently passed by the Indian government, was criticized for diluting Muslim community rights. Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state, was to be potentially affected the most, especially when seen through the lens of those resisting non-Kashmiri Indians from establishing homes and businesses in Kashmir, now a Union Territory administered directly from New Delhi.

Pakistan officially denied involvement and condemned the terror attacks. What a surprise.

The military response

After a couple of weeks of exercises like meetings and mock drills, the Indian armed forces launched Operation Sindoor in the early hours of May 7. The strikes were:

• Precise, targeting only terror infrastructure, avoiding civilian casualties.
• Limited, as no Pakistani military installations were hit.

Pakistan, however, viewed the incursion as an attack on its sovereign soil, especially when preceded by India placing the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance—an act Pakistan considered hostile. Retaliatory attacks followed, causing losses on both sides.

International diplomacy

US President Donald Trump later claimed to have brokered a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. India remained silent until 13 May, then denied his role.⁶ Nonetheless, Pakistan thanked him and floated a Nobel Peace Prize nomination for him,⁷ leading the US to cosy up with Pakistan. India’s assertion denying the role of any external party in the ceasefire, which seems to have “inflamed the situation”, later led to the US imposing a 50% tariff on Indian goods.

Global reactions

The United Nations condemned the Pahalgam attack, and pressed on “the need to hold perpetrators, organizers, financiers and sponsors of this reprehensible act of terrorism accountable and bring them to justice”.⁵

Various governments called for restraint and offered mediation. India declined intervention, insisting on bilateral resolution. Pakistan, having suspended the Shimla Agreement, had no such qualms.

Diplomatic setbacks for India

Overall:

1. The FATF kept Pakistan off the Grey List.⁸
2. The IMF approved the $1 bn disbursement to Pakistan as part of the $7 bn Extended Fund Facility bailout package, despite India’s objections.
3. US commentary on social media equated India and Pakistan, undermining India’s narrative.
4. Speculation of Pakistan’s downing of an IAF Rafale jet using Chinese-supplied fighter aircraft⁹ raised doubts about Indian air superiority.¹⁰
5. In Pakistan, the conflict “[unified] fractured political forces domestically”, along with increasing the popularity of the Pakistani armed forces among their public.¹¹

Domestic questions

Before reading any further, please refer to my political stance.

While the political parties across the spectrum remained largely united through the operation, the Opposition, during the Parliament session around the end of July, raised questions:

Security lapses

The Baisaran Valley, a popular tourist spot, was essentially unguarded during the terror attack. Critics like Ms Priyanka Gandhi Vadra argued that no amount of “self-praise by the government about Operation Sindoor could take away their culpability that tourists were left without any security”.¹²

Parliamentary scrutiny

Mr Mallikarjun Kharge raised concerns about political constraints hampering military decisions, as reported by the defence attaché in Indonesia¹³ and about the timing of Prime Minister Modi’s cancelled Kashmir visit mere days before the attack.

Opposition leaders questioned the abrupt ceasefire decision while the Indian forces held a tactical advantage.¹⁴

Revisiting the narrative

What began as a terrorist attack initially claimed by The Resistance Front—and subsequently denied by the organization—ultimately proved to be a Lashkar‑e‑Taiba (LeT) operation.¹⁵ Yet the narrative remains muddled. Eyewitness accounts speak of four to six assailants, whereas the official NIA report cites three perpetrators at Baisaran. Adding to the confusion, the J&K Police described two of the suspects as Pakistani and one as Kashmiri, while Mr Amit Shah, speaking in Parliament, asserted that all three terrorists were from Pakistan—a position echoed by the Indian Army’s official statement. The divergent messages make it difficult to discern a clear picture.

On a related note, it is noteworthy that Mr Shah delivered the statement in Parliament rather than Mr Rajnath Singh. The J&K Police fall under Mr Shah’s ministry, whereas the Indian Army reports to Mr Singh’s ministry. Despite this, Mr Shah appears to align with the Army’s narrative, even though the police and the Army issued differing accounts. He did acknowledge that Operation Mahadev was a joint effort between the Indian Army and the J&K Police, yet it was the Army that neutralized the terrorists, and Mr Shah—not Mr Singh—spoke about it on the floor of Parliament. Our nation traditionally adheres to strict protocol; if parliamentary procedure was sidestepped here, it could set an undesirable precedent.

Personal take

This is, of course, my personal take—open to agreement or dissent. I’m not a reporter; I can only shape opinions from the material I encounter. I make a conscious effort to steer clear of the narratives that mainstream television often pushes, since, in my experience, those broadcasts tend to tilt toward a glossy, alarmist or jingoistic portrayal dictated by viewership and advertisers (which is often the government), frequently diverging from the facts.

My routine involves reading newspapers and consulting online outlets that I deem reliable. Even when the coverage is uncomfortable, I lean toward outlets with a demonstrably strong record of journalistic credibility.

The international response: a critical view

The global community’s condemnation stopped short of naming Pakistan as the sponsor of terror. A more explicit attribution could have constituted a diplomatic win for India. Similarly, bringing Pakistan back onto the FATF Grey List or blocking the IMF’s $1 bn tranche would have signaled a stronger international censure. Neither occurred.

Instead, the global community’s response mirrored India’s stance on the Russia–Ukraine conflict: a generic condemnation of aggression without naming aggressors. No nation has formally acknowledged Pakistan’s role in sponsoring the Pahalgam attackers.

Ceasefire debate

From a strategic standoint, Operation Sindoor was designed as a limited, non-escalatory strike against terror infrastructure. We (India) declared the objects achieved, leaving Pakistani military assets untouched. Pakistan, perceiving the incursion as a violation, responded militarily, prompting a tit-for-tat cycle that our forces eventually contained by targeting Pakistan’s physical infrastructure such as runways and air defence systems, thereby slowing down their forces.

Prolonged war would have been costly—both in lives and finance—without delivering clear gains. Moreover, an aggressive Indian advance could have attracted sanctions, while Pakistan would likely have garnered international sympathy.

Accountability vs resignation

Opposition MPs highlighted security lapses and called for ministerial resignations.¹⁶ While accountability is essential, a resignation alone may not guarantee systemic change; politicians have always returned to power after stepping down. Structural reforms and transparent inquiries are arguably more effective.

Intelligence shortcomings

The absence of security personnel in the tourist-heavy Baisaran Valley points to an intelligence and planning failure. On the other hand, gathering actionable intel in dense forest terrain is inherently challenging. But the gap remains unsettling and warrants thorough investigation. The administration has remained quiet so far on this, except for the Lt Governor of J&K taking “full responsibility” for the incident, an action fraught with doubts and questions.

Military capability

India’s emphasis on self-reliance—“Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat”—has yielded a notable success in this operation:

• Precise cross-border strikes demonstrated operational accuracy.
• Indigenous air-defence systems (Akashteer) performed admirably.
• The overall campaign showcased a blend of restraint and decisive force, reinforcing deterrence without escalating to a full-scale war.¹⁷

As an essay about weapons for wars of today put it:

In the skies over Pakistan, India didn’t just dominate. It redefined regional deterrence. … India didn’t just talk about reform. It executed it. And won.

Closing thoughts

Reading various analyses of Operation Sindoor reinforced my belief that the operation was a strategic, limited war—conducted under the shadow of nuclear escalation,¹⁸ with clear objectives and measured means. Its success lies not in sheer destruction,¹⁹ but in achieving political aims while avoiding a broader conflagration.

Even if the operation bolstered Prime Minister Modi’s domestic standing, the core achievement was safeguarding Indian citizens and demonstrating a calibrated response to cross-border terrorism. The armed forces, ministries, and spokespersons communicated consistently, contrasting sharply with the chaotic narratives emerging from Pakistan’s side.

Nevertheless, as a sovereign democratic republic, our government must remain answerable, responsible and accountable to the people of India.